El desarrollo humano es, en el contexto de los estudios del desarrollo internacional, un concepto difundido a partir de 1990 por el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD). Este artículo propone una interpretación alternativa del concepto de desarrollo humano que resuelve algunas inconsistencias producidas por la confluencia de las distintas corrientes teóricas que dieron origen al concepto. La nueva interpretación propuesta proviene de los aportes del enfoque aristotélico de Martha Nussbaum y, más directamente, de la antropología aristotélica (...) y las nociones de acto y potencia. Se argumenta que el desarrollo humano puede ser entendido como el cambio que busca la realización plena del potencial humano. (shrink)

El concepto de desarrollo humano del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) surge en 1990 como una crítica a la consideración de la economía como el fin último de los esfuerzos del desarrollo. En la visión del PNUD, la economía es considerada un fin relativo, es decir, un fin y un medio para el desarrollo humano. Al considerar, por su parte, el fin del desarrollo humano, este es identificado con el ensanchamiento de las opciones y libertades de (...) que gozan los individuos. En este sentido, este concepto de desarrollo humano hace alusión a una práctica política más que a un entendimiento ético-ontológico del ser humano, evitando referirse a desarrollo humano entendido como un desarrollo del ser humano. Este artículo explora los antecedentes del concepto del desarrollo humano del PNUD y los fines que consideran estos enfoques previos. Se observa que la consideración subjetivista del PNUD proviene de la teoría de Amartya Sen, quien queda sujeto a la crítica objetivista de Martha Nussbaum al no considera un fin objetivo para los asuntos humanos, crítica que puede de igual manera aplicarse al concepto de desarrollo humano del PNUD. (shrink)

Una interpretación aristotélica del concepto de desarrollo humano propone como fin último del desarrollo la eudaimonía o felicidad, esto es, la plena realización de la capacidad eudemónica en el alma humana. Para esto se requiere del desarrollo de sus partes racional e irracional, lo que demanda como medios una ética y una dianoética del desarrollo, referidos a los modos de ser de las respectivas partes del alma. La interacción entre ambas partes genera siempre un ciclo virtuoso, existiendo la posibilidad de (...) influencias externas a través de la educación, la costumbre, la economía, la legislación y la política. -/- An Aristotelian approach of the concept of human development proposes eudaimonía or happiness as the ultimate goal of development, that is, the full realization of the eudemonic capacity in the human soul. For this, the development of its rational and irrational parts is required, which in turn requires an ethics and dianoethics of development as means, referring to the characters of the respective parts of the soul. The interaction between both parts always generates a virtuous cycle, with the possibility of external influences through education, custom, economics, legislation and politics. (shrink)

It’s constitutive of classical theism that there is a necessarily existent personal god who is also the creator of the universe, where the latter claim includes at least the following three theses: (i) God is wholly distinct from the natural world; (ii) God is the originating or sustaining cause of the natural world; and (iii) God created the natural world ex nihilo, i.e., without the use of pre-existing materials. Call this tripartite component of classical theism the classical view of creation. (...) In this paper, I offer a new argument against classical theism. In particular, I argue that creation ex nihilo is prima facie impossible, and that since the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is constitutive of classical theism, classical theism is false. (shrink)

The reward system of science is the priority rule. The first scientist making a new discovery is rewarded with prestige, while second runners get little or nothing. Michael Strevens, following Philip Kitcher, defends this reward system, arguing that it incentivizes an efficient division of cognitive labor. I argue that this assessment depends on strong implicit assumptions about the replicability of findings. I question these assumptions on the basis of metascientific evidence and argue that the priority rule systematically discourages replication. My (...) analysis leads us to qualify Kitcher and Strevens’s contention that a priority-based reward system is normatively desirable for science. (shrink)

The philosophy of perception has been mostly focused on vision, to the detriment of other modalities like audition or olfaction. In this paper I focus on olfaction and olfactory experience, and raise the following questions: is olfaction a perceptual-representational modality? If so, what does it represent? My goal in the paper is, firstly, to provide an affirmative answer to the first question, and secondly, to argue that olfaction represents odors in the form of olfactory objects, to which olfactory qualities are (...) attributed. In order to do this I develop an empirically adequate notion of olfactory object that is sensitive to the peculiarities of olfaction, and defend it against various objections. (shrink)

This collection highlights the new trend away from rationalism and toward empiricism in the epistemology of modality. Accordingly, the book represents a wide range of positions on the empirical sources of modal knowledge. Readers will find an introduction that surveys the field and provides a brief overview of the work, which progresses from empirically-sensitive rationalist accounts to fully empiricist accounts of modal knowledge. Early chapters focus on challenges to rationalist theories, essence-based approaches to modal knowledge, and the prospects for naturalizing (...) modal epistemology. The middle chapters present positive accounts that reject rationalism, but which stop short of advocating exclusive appeal to empirical sources of modal knowledge. The final chapters mark a transition toward exclusive reliance on empirical sources of modal knowledge. They explore ways of making similarity-based, analogical, inductive, and abductive arguments for modal claims based on empirical information. Modal epistemology is coming into its own as a field, and this book has the potential to anchor a new research agenda. (shrink)

It is common in psychiatry and other sciences to describe an individual or a type of individual in terms of its disposition to manifest specific effects in a particular range of circumstances. According to one understanding, dispositions are statistical regularities of an individual or type of individual in specific circumstances. According to another understanding, dispositions are properties of individuals in virtue of which such regularities hold. This entry considers a number of ways of making each of these senses of disposition (...) more precise while discussing a number of dangers lurking in careless use of the concept of a disposition. (shrink)

While most people believe the best possible life they could lead would be an immortal one, so‐called “immortality curmudgeons” disagree. Following Bernard Williams, they argue that, at best, we have no prudential reason to live an immortal life, and at worst, an immortal life would necessarily be bad for creatures like us. In this article, we examine Bernard Williams' seminal argument against the desirability of immortality and the subsequent literature it spawned. We first reconstruct and motivate Williams' somewhat cryptic argument (...) in three parts. After that, we elucidate and motivate the three best (and most influential) counterarguments to Williams' seminal argument. Finally, we review, and critically examine, two further distinct arguments in favor of the anti‐immortality position. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as principais abordagens em que a psicologia social clássica norte-americana teorizou sobre o preconceito racial, o racismo e o antirracismo e, a partir delas, trazer os estudos críticos da branquitude como possibilidades para superar os limites identificados nessa corrente, que ora apresenta um indivíduo fora da estrutura, ora a estrutura sem indivíduos. Para isto, neste artigo definimos três abordagens propostas pela psicologia social norte-americana: teste de associação implícita (Greenwald & Banaji 2013); teoria do contato (...) intergrupal e racismo aversivo (Pettigrew 1997, Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986); e emoções específicas (Leach et al., 2002). A partir daí mostramos como os estudos críticos da branquitude se apresentam como uma síntese entre essas duas posições opostas, que oscilam entre o indivíduo e a estrutura. Nesta perspectiva, a estrutura se manifesta na própria experiência subjetiva do indivíduo, que se torna capaz de identificá-la em seu próprio campo experiencial. (shrink)

A key premise of the kalam cosmological argument is that the universe began to exist. However, while a number of philosophers have offered powerful criticisms of William Lane Craig’s defense of the premise, J.P. Moreland has also offered a number of unique arguments in support of it, and to date, little attention has been paid to these in the literature. In this paper, I attempt to go some way toward redressing this matter. In particular, I shall argue that Moreland’s philosophical (...) arguments against the possibility of traversing a beginningless past are unsuccessful. (shrink)

Niche construction theory highlights the active role of organisms in modifying their environment. A subset of these modifications is the developmental niche, which concerns ecological, epistemic, social and symbolic legacies inherited by organisms as resources that scaffold their developmental processes. Since in this theory development is a situated process that takes place in a culturally structured environment, we may reasonably ask if implicit cultural biases may, in some cases, be responsible for maladaptive developmental niches. In this paper we wish to (...) argue for an affirmative answer. In order to do so, we first propose to conceptualize implicit bias as embodied perceptual habits, and then proceed to show that these habits are at least partially responsible for maladaptive developmental niches of children with Down syndrome and autism. With this framework we thus hope to bring together two fields of research that haven’t been explicitly connected: implicit bias and niche construction theory. Linking these two theories may bring benefits both to implicit bias researchers, who can extend this concept to characterize other sets of processes as biased, as well as to niche construction theorists, who will have a useful theoretical tool to diagnose maladaptive features of niches brought about by sociocultural biases. (shrink)

The necessity of a continuous creation by God, the need of a creation that is prolonged in the time, is an important issue in the Metaphysics of Descartes; for the being of the human conscience is not so persistent and so strong as the being of a really substance. The Cartesian cogito raises the problem of the weakness of this needy being: the distance between what is in each case thought, which is not temporal, and the thinking itself, which is (...) in the time. Descartes has very interesting observations about this theme. (shrink)

Neste trabalho, investigo a possibilidade de compatibilidade entre o pessimismo filosófico e a compreensão da morte como um mal para quem morre. Por pessimismo filosófico, compreendo a doutrina filosófica que mantém como tese fundamental que a não-existência é preferível à existência, de modo que o pessimismo é tomado como a filosofia de que a vida não vale a pena ser vivida. Por mal da morte, me refiro à compreensão da morte como um dano para o indivíduo que morre, cujo pressuposto (...) em diferentes abordagens contemporâneas é o de que a morte só é um mal no caso de continuar existindo ser preferível a deixar de existir. Desse modo, o problema discutido é a aparente incompatibilidade entre a tese de que a não-existência é preferível à existência e a tese de que continuar existindo é preferível a deixar de existir. Busco demonstrar que essa (in)compatibilidade depende do modo como fundamentamos o pessimismo filosófico. Para tanto, examino dois argumentos para o pessimismo filosófico e suas implicações para o mal da morte: o argumento a priori de Arthur Schopenhauer e o argumento da assimetria de David Benatar. Concluo que o primeiro desses argumentos nos leva para a conclusão de que a morte não é um mal, mas que o segundo argumento compatibiliza o pessimismo filosófico e a compreensão da morte como um mal para quem morre. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem por finalidade analisar, a partir do livro V da obra Ethica Nicomachea, se a justiça poderia ser tomada como um meio que irá auxiliar os cidadãos a desenvolver plenamente as suas virtudes. Buscar-se-á fundamentar que é através da justiça que os bons cidadãos seriam formados, bem como o bom caráter seria cultivado. Analisar-se-á, também, ainda que minimamente, o que Aristóteles entende de fato por justiça, de que o justo seria dar a cada um o que lhe (...) é devido, o que merece, haja vista que essa afirmação traz consigo um peso muito grande, pois nos faz indagar sobre o que seria o devido de cada indivíduo, bem como quais seriam as bases relevantes do mérito. Isto é, se o justo é dar a cada um o que lhe é devido, cabe a nós nos perguntarmos de que forma e critério seria usado na distribuição. De certa forma, ao raciocinarmos sobre justiça e direitos, consequentemente temos de raciocinar sobre a finalidade, o objetivo, o telos das atividades que circundam a vida social na Pólis. Buscar-se-á discutir sobre os temas apresentados, porém não se tem por finalidade propor medidas para pôr um fim na discussão. (shrink)

A ansiedade gerada pela possível criação de inteligência artificial geral, algo profetizado desde a fundação do campo de pesquisa (i.e., Dartmouth's Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence) (MCCARTHY et al., 1955), é algo comumente investigado dentro dos círculos transhumanistas e singularistas (KURZWEIL, 2005; CHALMERS, 2010; TEGMARK, 2016; 2017; CORRÊA; DE OLIVEIRA, 2021). Por exemplo, em seu livro “Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies”, Nick Bostrom (2014) apresenta uma série de argumentos para justificar a ideia de que precisamos ser cautelosos em relação a (...) criação de inteligência artificial avançada ou inteligência artificial geral. Contudo, muito dos argumentos levantados, em suas versões originais (i.e., convergência instrumental e ortogonalidade (OMOHUNDRO, 2008), são baseados em noções “vagas” de conceitos complexos (i.e., “inteligência”, “racionalidade”, “agência”). O objetivo deste resumo (apresentação) será introduzir o leitor/ouvinte ao campo de Segurança da Inteligência Artificial. Nesse campo, questões como o “Problema de controle” (i.e., evitar construir inadvertidamente uma inteligência artificial geral que prejudicará seus criadores) e o “Problema de Alinhamento” (i.e., criar sistemas de inteligência artificial que permaneçam seguros mesmo quando atuando de forma autônoma no ambiente real), que são questões muitas vezes debatidas apenas dentro da Filosofia ou Ficção Científica, ganham um aspecto muito mais real e formal (AMODEI et al., 2016, HUBINGER et al., 2019). A criação de alguns dos modelos de inteligência artificial mais avançados já criados (e.g., AlphaGo, GPT-3) (SILVER el al., 2016; BROWN et al., 2020), está ligado a utilização de dois paradigmas da área de Aprendizagem de Máquina, i.e., Aprendizagem Profunda e Aprendizagem por Reforço. Dentro deste contexto, podemos definir “um sistema autônomo inteligente” como “um sistema que implementa uma política ótima (tecnicamente "ϵ-greedy optimal") para alguma função de recompensa” (ORSEAU et al., 2018). Podemos também definir tais sistemas como “maximizadores de utilidade esperada” (VON NEUMANN; MORGENSTERN, 1944). Um sistema de IA maximizando uma função de recompensa (i.e., objetivo) especificada erroneamente pode vir a causar danos reais quando interagindo no ambiente real, seja por erros de especificação (i.e., Efeitos Colaterais Negativos, Hackeamento de Recompensa, Interrupção Segura), ou quando o domínio de treinamento é diferente do domínio de implantação (i.e., Exploração Segura e Mudança de Domínio). Ao mesmo tempo, especificar objetivos complexos (e.g., preferências e valores humanos) é uma tarefa extremamente complexa, e quando visamos a possibilidade de inteligência artificial avançada agindo no mundo real, é imperativo que tais sistemas estejam: (1) alinhados com nossos objetivos; e (2) desenvolvidos com um design que evite os problemas citados acima. Contudo, tais problemas permanecem em aberto. Por fim, gostaria de ressaltar que no cerne desta problemática, não temos apenas problemas técnicos de aprendizagem de máquina, mas uma importante questão de cunho “Moral”: “O que é a coisa ‘certa” a fazer”? “Qual o objetivo correto a ser perseguido”? “Como podemos especificar isso”? Perguntas como essas prometem um fértil campo para pesquisas interdisciplinares envolvendo inteligência artificial, aprendizagem de máquina, ciências da computação e filosofia moral. (shrink)

In the philosophy of memory there is a tension between a preservationist and a constructivist view of memory reflected in the debate between causalism and simulationism. Causalism is not only committed to the claim that there must be an appropriate causal connection between the remembered event and the content represented at retrieval but also that such connection is possible because of a content-preserving memory trace. Simulationism, by contrast, rejects the need for an appropriate causal condition and, thereby, makes the appeal (...) to memory traces unnecessary. In this paper I argue that while the are strong conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to support a constructivist view of memory, the empirical evidence also suggest that the initial formulation of simulationism needs to be revised. In particular, I argue, first, that simulationism’s commitment to a single cognitive system for mental time travel is likely wrong, and second, that simulationism cannot get rid of memory traces altogether, as they are still explanatorily indispensable when it comes to explaining a large number of memory-related phenomena. At the end, I end up suggesting a way of thinking about memory traces that, I think, is compatible with simulationism and a constructivist view of memory. If the view I put forth is on the right track, then an updated version of simulationism can help to dispel the dichotomy between causalism and simulationism as a false one. (shrink)

One of the strands of the Transhumanist movement, Singulitarianism, studies the possibility that high-level artificial intelligence may be created in the future, debating ways to ensure that the interaction between human society and advanced artificial intelligence can occur safely and beneficially. But how can we guarantee this safe interaction? Are there any indications that a Singularity may be on the horizon? In trying to answer these questions, We'll make a small introduction to the area of security research in artificial intelligence. (...) We'll review some of the current paradigms in the development of autonomous intelligent systems and evidence that we can use to prospect the coming of a possible technological Singularity. Finally, we will present a reflection using the COVID-19 pandemic, something that showed that our biggest problem in managing existential risks is our lack of coordination skills as a global society. (shrink)

Felipe Gonzalez and Victoria Camps on the Catalan independent.

The logos question, one of the most important among the subjects that traverse the Plato's Sophist, has in fact some different aspects: the criticism of father Parmenides' logos, that is unable to speak about the not-being, but also about the being; the relations between logos and its cognates, phantasia, doxa and dianoia; the logos’ complex structure, that is a compound with onoma and rema; the difference between naming and saying, two distinct but inseparable actions; the logical and ontological conditions that (...) make possible to say the truth, or to lie or simply to joke; the necessity of a most flexible logos that allows us to speak about the not-being, and about the being, but at the same time is a logos dangerously similar to the sophist’ one; finally, the identity between the power to produce “spoken images” and the very power to speak. The aim of the present article is giving a systematical view of the matter that grasps all these faces. (shrink)

I argue that modal epistemology should pay more attention to questions about the structure and function of modal thought. We can treat these questions from synchronic and diachronic angles. From a synchronic perspective, I consider whether a general argument for the epistemic support of modal though can be made on the basis of modal thoughs’s indispensability for what Enoch and Schechter (2008) call rationally required epistemic projects. After formulating the argument, I defend it from various objections. I also examine the (...) possibility of considering the indispensability of modal thought in terms of its components. Finally, I argue that we also need to approach these issues from a diachronic perspective, and I sketch how to approach this task. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview and critical discussion of cosmological arguments for theism, with special focus on the Kalam argument and arguments from contingency.

Em meio à chamada “virada biológica” dos estudos aristotélicos, seguiremos a hipótese levantada por alguns comentadores de que a Poética de Aristóteles partilha do modelo biológico estrutural de seu pensamento, o que implica que também a poesia possuiria uma “história natural”. Sendo assim, o propósito deste artigo é o de pensar a comédia a partir deste paradigma. O texto dividir-se-á em duas partes principais: primeiramente, apresentaremos evidências que corroboram a hipótese de que a Poética foi escrita tendo como modelo estrutural (...) a biologia de Aristóteles e, por conta disso, deve ser lida tendo isso como pano de fundo. Em segundo lugar, aplicaremos esse modelo de pensamento à comédia, de modo a conjecturar o que seria plenamente a arte cômica numa perspectiva aristotélica. (shrink)

The primary aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether considerations about a priori domains and abstract objects favor atheism over theism.

O fenômeno de aceleração social, intimamente ligado a nossa modernização tecnológica e os sistemas políticos e sociais que adotamos, vem sendo alvo de questionamentos por parte da teoria crítica por diversos filósofos e sociólogos, principalmente em relação a se tal "aceleração" seja algo que, possa ser justificável pelo bem comum da sociedade. De fato, as rápidas mudanças que ocorreram no último século causaram uma tremenda mudança em nossos estilos-de-vida, e na maneira como experienciamos o mundo. Que a nossa sociedade mudou (...) e continua a mudar é um fato evidente quando olhamos criticamente para o passado e presente, e comparamos diferentes épocas da história humana. Neste ensaio tentaremos explorar algumas possíveis hipóteses que fundamentem o comportamento aceleracionista em certos fatores e mecanismo biológicos que caracterizam os sistemas de motivação e saciação humanos. Também tentaremos mostrar como certos fenômenos sociais podem auxiliar em fortalecer este tipo de comportamento, e suas possíveis origens evolutivas. Este estudo tem como objetivo principal fundamentar a Tese Aceleracionista em evidências neurofisiológicas, cognitivo-comportamentais, evolutivas e sociais. Palavras-chave: aceleração; recompensa; saciação; ciências cognitivas; teoria dos gêneros. (shrink)

Experts in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development predict that advances in the development of intelligent systems and agents will reshape vital areas in our society. Nevertheless, if such an advance is not made prudently and critically-reflexively, it can result in negative outcomes for humanity. For this reason, several researchers in the area have developed a robust, beneficial, and safe concept of AI for the preservation of humanity and the environment. Currently, several of the open problems in the field of AI research (...) arise from the difficulty of avoiding unwanted behaviors of intelligent agents and systems, and at the same time specifying what we really want such systems to do, especially when we look for the possibility of intelligent agents acting in several domains over the long term. It is of utmost importance that artificial intelligent agents have their values aligned with human values, given the fact that we cannot expect an AI to develop human moral values simply because of its intelligence, as discussed in the Orthogonality Thesis. Perhaps this difficulty comes from the way we are addressing the problem of expressing objectives, values, and ends, using representational cognitive methods. A solution to this problem would be the dynamic approach proposed by Dreyfus, whose phenomenological philosophy shows that the human experience of being-in-the-world in several aspects is not well represented by the symbolic or connectionist cognitive method, especially in regards to the question of learning values. A possible approach to this problem would be to use theoretical models such as SED (situated embodied dynamics) to address the values learning problem in AI. (shrink)

The radical evil. Notes on the revolt of masses. In his Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant speaks about a radical evil present in the human being, a tendency to place before the desire with regard to the rational duty, which is impossible to tear up by the roots from the human nature. In The revolt of the masses, Ortega also speaks about an evil that is anyway present in the so called mass-man, in each one of us, (...) and that is not to eradicate. The aim of this paper is to read the book of Ortega y Gasset in dialogue with Kant. (shrink)

Eshel Ben-Jacob’s manuscript entitled ‘Bacterial wisdom, Gödel’s theorem and creative genomic webs’ summarizes decades of work demonstrating adaptive mutagenesis in bacterial genomes. Bacterial genomes, each an essential part of a Kantian whole that is a single bacterium, are thus not independent of the environment as sensed; and a single bacterium is therefore a semiotic entity. Ben-Jacob suggests this but errs in 1) assigning autonomy to the genome, and 2) analogizing through computation without making clear whether he is doing so for (...) illustrative purposes or making committed ontological propositions. We reinterpret adaptive mutagenesis and related phenomena in ways both metaphysically rigorous and revealing. We conclude that bacteria are much farther removed from the ‘self-organizing’ world of inanimate process than from the Peircian world of signs; and a critical reappraisal of existing knowledge can enhance our understanding of selfhood, semiosis, and the roots of subjective experience. (shrink)

The temporality of human action is very peculiar: different from the cosmic time and even paradoxical, inasmuch as it is really a circular time. The aim of this essay is to study this circularity in the sphere of human activity through the relations between the notions of potency and habit in the Aristotelian Ethics, among others structural conditions of the action. These structural conditions are explored by Aristotle as those which make possible to judge the actions.

Besides the general agreement about the human capability of reflection, there is a large area of disagreement and debate about the nature and value of “reflective scrutiny” and the role of “second-order states” in everyday life. This problem has been discussed in a vast and heterogeneous literature about topics such as epistemic injustice, epistemic norms, agency, understanding, meta-cognition etc. However, there is not yet any extensive and interdisciplinary work, specifically focused on the topic of the epistemic value of reflection. This (...) volume is one of the first attempts aimed at providing an innovative contribution, an exchange between philosophy, epistemology and psychology about the place and value of reflection in everyday life. -/- Our goal in the next sections is not to offer an exhaustive overview of recent work on epistemic reflection, nor to mimic all of the contributions made by the chapters in this volume. We will try to highlight some topics that have motivated a new resumption of this field and, with that, drawing on chapters from this volume where relevant. -/- Two elements defined the scope and content of this volume, on the one hand, the crucial contribution of Ernest Sosa, whose works provide original and thought-provoking contributions to contemporary epistemology in setting a new direction for old dilemmas about the nature and value of knowledge, giving a central place to reflection. On the other hand, the recent developments of cultural psychology, in the version of the “Aalborg approach”, reconsider the object and scope of psychological sciences, stressing that “[h]uman conduct is purposeful”. (shrink)

Neste artigo, analiso três casos que foram propostos na literatura filosófica como contraexemplos à abordagem dos interesses relativos ao tempo do dano da morte, buscando demonstrar como eles podem ser respondidos. Para tanto, o texto divide-se em quatro seções. Na primeira, introduzo as teses fundamentais da abordagem dos interesses relativos ao tempo sobre o que determina a magnitude do dano decorrente da morte para quem morre, tal como formulado por Jeff McMahan (2002). Na seção seguinte, explico dois pressupostos centrais dessa (...) abordagem, a saber, que a identidade pessoal não é o que fundamenta nossas razões de preocupação egoísta com o futuro e que a unidade psicológica consta entre as relações que fundamentam essa preocupação. Na terceira seção, apresento os (possíveis) contraexemplos, sendo eles o Caso da morte futura (Broome, 2004), o Caso da operação no cavalo Tommy (Harman, 2011) e o Caso do mal maior (Cunha, 2023). Na seção final, defendo que esses casos podem ser respondidos a partir da consideração moral e prudencial de determinados interesses relativos ao tempo futuro. (shrink)

This article is a commentary of the section 5.552 of the Tractatus, about the “experience” that is necessary to understand logic, from the point of view of the so called continental philosophy. In this commentary are tackled some questions: what is exactly this “experience”?; what does mean that logic is a speculative image of the world?; how are the relations between logic and metaphysics (the two components of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein)? All these questions lead us to the conception of (...) philosophy present in the Tractatus and to the role, so important, the two following problems play in this book: the reflection on the philosophical method and the transcendental character of being. Just for this it is necessary to take it seriously the opposition between speaking of something and speaking about something, employed in the final section and so clear in German as habitually mistranslated. (shrink)

This article analyzes the epistemological legitimation of mathematics in natural philosophy in the seventeenth century. In the Renaissance it was claimed that mathematics does not meet the Aristotelian criteria of scientificity, and that it did not explain the efficient and final causes. So, its critics, inspired by the Aristotelian tradition, rejected the first attempts to mathematize natural philosophy. The epistemological conditions involved in the debate are examined on the scientific nature of mathematics and its relevance to natural philosophy. A historiographical (...) tour of the mathematization of nature is made to provide new weighing elements with respect to a historically and philosophically more conceptual characterization of the emergence of modern science. (shrink)

The AI Robotics Ethics Society (AIRES) is a non-profit organization founded in 2018 by Aaron Hui to promote awareness and the importance of ethical implementation and regulation of AI. AIRES is now an organization with chapters at universities such as UCLA (Los Angeles), USC (University of Southern California), Caltech (California Institute of Technology), Stanford University, Cornell University, Brown University, and the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil). AIRES at PUCRS is the first international chapter of AIRES, and (...) as such, we are committed to promoting and enhancing the AIRES Mission. Our mission is to focus on educating the AI leaders of tomorrow in ethical principles to ensure that AI is created ethically and responsibly. As there are still few proposals for how we should implement ethical principles and normative guidelines in the practice of AI system development, the goal of this work is to try to bridge this gap between discourse and praxis. Between abstract principles and technical implementation. In this work, we seek to introduce the reader to the topic of AI Ethics and Safety. At the same time, we present several tools to help developers of intelligent systems develop "good" models. This work is a developing guide published in English and Portuguese. Contributions and suggestions are welcome. (shrink)

A AI Robotics Ethics Society (AIRES) é uma organização sem fins lucrativos fundada em 2018 por Aaron Hui, com o objetivo de se promover a conscientização e a importância da implementação e regulamentação ética da AI. A AIRES é hoje uma organização com capítulos em universidade como UCLA (Los Angeles), USC (University of Southern California), Caltech (California Institute of Technology), Stanford University, Cornell University, Brown University e a Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (Brasil). AIRES na PUCRS é (...) o primeiro capítulo internacional da AIRES, e como tal, estamos empenhados em promover e aprimorar a Missão AIRES. Nossa missão é focar na educação dos líderes da IA de amanhã em princípios éticos, para assegurar que a IA seja criada de forma ética e responsável. Como ainda existem poucas propostas de como devemos implementar princípios éticos e diretrizes normativas na prática do desenvolvimento de sistemas de IA, o objetivo deste trabalho é tentar diminuir esta lacuna entre o discurso e a práxis. Entre princípios abstratos e implementação técnica. Neste trabalho, buscamos introduzir o leitor ao tema da Ética e Segurança da IA. Ao mesmo tempo, apresentamos uma série de ferramentas para auxiliar desenvolvedores de sistemas inteligentes a desenvolver “bons” modelos. Este trabalho é um guia em desenvolvimento publicado em inglês e português. Contribuições e sugestões são bem vindas. (shrink)

The thought experiment is a seemingly indispensable tool in the armchair philosopher’s toolbox. One wonders, for example, how philosophers could come to think that justified true belief isn’t knowledge, that reference isn’t determined by an expression’s associated description, or that moral responsibility doesn’t require the ability to do otherwise, without the use of thought experiments. But even if thought experiments play an integral role in philosophical methodology, their legitimacy is at least initially puzzling: one would think that significant knowledge of (...) the world requires extensive empirical investigation. But since thought experiments are done from the armchair, how can they tell us about the world? -/- A standard account of the nature and utility of thought experiments provides an answer to this question, and in a way that fits naturally with a standard picture of the nature of the facts philosophers investigate: Philosophers are about the business of investigating the essences of things and kinds. But a thing’s essential and accidental properties are modal properties. Thus, one can discern a thing’s essence by discovering its modal profile. But if so, then thought experiments are naturally suited as tools for the armchair philosopher. For thought experiments shed light on modal facts. Therefore, since philosophers investigate essences, facts about essence are modal facts, and the thought experiment is one of the few tools they have for discerning such facts, thought experiments play a legitimate and indispensable role in philosophical methodology. In my dissertation, I argue that the standard account of the nature and utility of thought experiments is inadequate, and sketch a more promising account. -/- First, I argue that our knowledge of possibility is restricted to the relatively humdrum. And if so, then since the standard account ties the utility of thought experiments to our knowledge of possibility, too many thought experiments will be ruled out as useless, which raises serious concerns about the significance, and perhaps even the legitimacy, of armchair philosophy. Thus, there is pressure for armchair philosophers to reject the standard account. -/- Second, I sketch an alternative picture of the nature of facts philosophers investigate – one that’s more fine-grained than the standard modal-profile picture. Relatedly, I sketch a correspondingly fine-grained semantics for claims about such facts. This alternative picture underwrites the legitimacy of a hitherto underappreciated sort of thought experiment, which I call the non-modal thought experiment. Such thought experiments shed light on facts about the world that are more fine-grained than what can be discerned by merely examining their modal profiles. I argue that non-modal thought experiments often succeed at just the points where the more familiar modal thought experiments fail, and thus that the two are naturally suited to complement one another in the philosopher’s practice. -/- Finally, I exploit the points mentioned above to sketch an account of the variety and utility of thought experiments that’s much more nuanced than that of the standard account. I then illustrate some of its virtues by indicating its ability to account for a wide range of epistemically forceful thought experiments – both humdrum and exotic –, and by demonstrating how it can be used to make progress in debates that have reached a stalemate due to conflicting modal intuitions. -/- . (shrink)

Filósofos como Marcuse han subrayado las propiedades liberadoras del quehacer artístico. Pero si hemos de pensar el arte como el Gran Rechazo, es necesario mostrar qué rechaza el arte y con qué busca sustituirlo. Respecto a estas preguntas, existen dos respuestas antagónicas. Mientras una busca en la experiencia artística rechazar lo dado en nombre de una verdad intemporal, la otra también reniega de lo dado, pero admite el carácter provisorio de toda verdad. Aunque en apariencia sutil, esta distinción es sustancial. (...) A partir de una lectura de Platón, muestro por qué en la primera posición no hay cabida para lo humano, y por qué de ella se desprenden implicaciones totalitarias. Para caracterizar a la segunda posición, me sirvo de la concepción estética de Octavio Paz y de la propuesta escultórica de Alexander Calder. Ambas propuestas permiten conciliar la insatisfacción que palpita en el arte con la alteridad que caracteriza a lo humano. (shrink)

En este trabajo se discute acerca de la posibilidad de llevar a cabo afirmaciones epistémicamente objetivas respecto del arte a partir de la filosofía de la sociedad de John Searle y de la epistemología del desacuerdo. Para ello se considerarán las distinciones ontológicamente objetivo/subjetivo y epistémicamente objetivo/subjetivo en relación con el arte como fenómeno relativo a la intencionalidad, señalándolo como ontológicamente subjetivo y epistémicamente objetivo. Luego se discutirá acerca del desacuerdo en torno a obras polémicas de arte y de la (...) disolución de tales desacuerdos al considerar la oposición entre creencia y aceptación según la propuesta de Jonathan Cohen. Finalmente, mostrando la posibilidad de generar acuerdos en torno al juicio de gustos, se señala el rol de las instituciones relativas al arte en nuestra comprensión del estatuto artístico de las obras polémicas. De esta manera, se pretende señalar que la apreciación de una obra como ‘arte’ es una cuestión objetiva dependiente de las instituciones que operan en nuestra sociedad. (shrink)

En este artículo se cuestiona el desempeño del enfoque responsabilidad en epistemología de las virtudes para responder a la pregunta normativa. Para ello, se indica que el concepto de virtud no es suficiente para dar cuenta los motivos de nuestros actos epistémicos ni individual ni socialmente, por lo que se sugiere recurrir a una reconstrucción de la epistemología del testimonio kantiana para mostrar cómo la ética subyacente a dicha propuesta permitiría concebir una teoría del conocimiento basada en una alternativa que (...) sí puede responder a la pregunta normativa. Así, se presenta como línea novedosa de investigación el analizar la posibilidad de una epistemología deontológica, es decir, una epistemología cuyo fundamento moral (y, por tanto, normativo respecto de todas las acciones que impliquen personas y no mero procesos en la adquisición y difusión de conocimiento) se sostiene por cuenta propia. De este modo, se concluye que es necesario considerar la propuesta kantiana como fundamento para investigaciones epistemológicas, cuestión que, tradicionalmente, no ha sido abordada en profundidad. (shrink)

Franz Kafka (1883-1924) e Albert Camus (1913-1960) publicaram suas obras em épocas que, embora distintas, enfrentavam desafios semelhantes do século XX, como as Guerras Mundiais e a crescente alienação diante de estruturas opressivas. O tcheco Kafka escreveu “O Processo” entre os anos de 1914 e 1915, publicando-o postumamente em 1925, em um período marcado pela Primeira Guerra Mundial e pelo surgimento de regimes autoritários. Já o franco-argelino Camus teceu “O Estrangeiro” em 1940 e o publicou em 1942, em meio à (...) Segunda Guerra Mundial e a ascensão do existencialismo como vigorosa corrente filosófica. (shrink)

As proposições condicionais receberam atenção teórica concentrada, embora intermitente, desde a Antiguidade. A atenção durante últimos quarenta anos tem sido intensa. Nesse artigo, apresentaremos os principais desenvolvimentos da análise lógica acerca das proposições condicionais e discutiremos como elas desempenham papel central em muitas teorias filosóficas. Na primeira parte dessas observações introdutórias, mostraremos como os antigos, principalmente as escolas megárica e estoica, envolveram-se com a questão dos condicionais e quão importante isso foi para os posteriores desenvolvimentos da análise lógica dos condicionais (...) no medievo e na Idade Moderna. Por fim, apresentaremos, já na contemporaneidade, C. I. Lewis expondo sua teoria da implicação estrita em franca oposição à doutrina da implicação que ele julgava errada. Espera-se que este trabalho sirva como a apresentação panorâmica de um campo que em lógica ainda é muito frutífero e fecundo para aprofundamentos e novas ideias. (shrink)

Aristotle's General Definition of the Syllogism may be taken as consisting of two parts: the Inferential Conditions and the Final Clause. Although this distinction is well known, traditional interpretations neglect the Final Clause and its influence on syllogistic. Instead, the aforementioned tradition focuses on the Inferential Conditions only. We intend to show that this neglect has severe consequences not just on syllogistic but on the whole exegesis of Aristotle's Prior Analytics I. Due to these consequences, our objective is to analyse (...) the General Definition's Final Clause and its consequences on syllogistic. We propose a reading of the Final Clause as an additional criterion for distinguishing some arguments as properly syllogistic ones and as a main theme which connects all parts of the Prior Analytics I into one coherent piece of work. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analiza, en el marco de la epistemología social aplicada (es decir, desde una perspectiva analítica y normativa) el debate en torno a la confiabilidad de Wikipedia como fuente de conocimiento, proponiendo que es fiable y que, por tanto, debiéramos confiar en ella para adquirir creencias verdaderas. En primer lugar, se analizan las limitaciones y aciertos de las posturas tradicionales acerca de la fiabilidad de Wikipedia, para luego cuestionar el rol epistemológico que ha adquirido la noción de (...) confianza en dicho debate. En segundo lugar, se introduce la noción de “confianza afectiva” propia de la epistemología del testimonio para contrastarla con la “confianza esperanza”, esto con el fin de caracterizar la normatividad social tanto interna como externa que rige y hace fiable a Wikipedia. Finalmente, se resumen los resultados en una serie de razones de orden epistémico para confiar en Wikipedia como fuente de conocimiento como lo son el poseer virtudes en relación con la difusión de información, mecanismos internos y externos que la sustentan, y su supervivencia al colapso del contexto en internet. De este modo, se sugiere que es adecuado, desde el punto de vista epistemológico, emplear con confianza Wikipedia en nuestra vida cotidiana. (shrink)

What does Cyberpunk and AI Ethics have to do with each other? Cyberpunk is a sub-genre of science fiction that explores the post-human relationships between human experience and technology. One similarity between AI Ethics and Cyberpunk literature is that both seek a dialogue in which the reader may inquire about the future and the ethical and social problems that our technological advance may bring upon society. In recent years, an increasing number of ethical matters involving AI have been pointed and (...) debated, and several ethical principles and guides have been suggested as governance policies for the tech industry. However, would this be the role of AI Ethics? To serve as a soft and ambiguous version of the law? I would like to promote in this article a more Cyberpunk way of doing AI Ethics, whit a more anarchic way of governance. In this study, I will seek to expose some of the deficits of the underlying power structures of our society, and suggest that AI governance be subject to public opinion, so that ‘good AI’ can become ‘good AI for all’. (shrink)

This thesis describes two classes of Dialectica categories. Chapter one introduces dialectica categories based on Goedel's Dialectica interpretation and shows that they constitute a model of Girard's Intuitionistic Linear Logic. Chapter two shows that, with extra assumptions, we can provide a comonad that interprets Girard's !-course modality. Chapter three presents the second class of Dialectica categories, a simplification suggested by Girard, that models (classical) Linear Logic and chapter four shows how to provide modalities ! and ? for this second class (...) of construction. (shrink)